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Abstract—Channel randomness can be exploited to generate 
secret keys. However, to ensure secrecy, it is necessary that the 
channel response of any eavesdropping party remain 
sufficiently de-correlated with that of the legitimate users’. In 
this paper, we investigate whether such de-correlation occurs 
for a body area network (BAN) operating in an indoor 
environment at 2.45 GHz. The hypothetical BAN configuration 
consisted of two legitimate transceivers, one situated on the 
user’s left wrist and the other on the user’s waist. The 
eavesdroppers were positioned in either a co-located or 
distributed manner in the area surrounding the BAN user. 
Using the simultaneous channel response measured at the 
legitimate BAN nodes and the eavesdropper positions for 
stationary and mobile scenarios, we analyze the localized 
correlation coefficient. This allows us to determine if it is 
possible to generate secret keys in the presence of multiple 
eavesdroppers in an indoor environment. Our experimental 
results show that although channel reciprocity was observed for 
both the stationary and the mobile scenarios, a higher de-
correlation between the legitimate users’ channels was observed 
for the stationary case. This indicates that mobile scenarios are 
better suited for secret key generation.  
Index Terms—secure communication, physical layer 
security, on-body measurements, correlation, fading 
characteristics, indoor communication.  
I.  INTRODUCTION  
Achieving a secrecy scheme that can be defended against 
potential eavesdroppers is important for the future security of 
body area networks (BANs). These networks have drawn a lot 
of attention for their use in healthcare applications. The 
limited power, memory, and the computational capabilities of 
BAN nodes, and the impact that could be caused by 
unauthorized access to sensitive information, presents 
significant challenges and motivation for implementing 
secure BAN communication.  
Many key management protocols for wireless sensor 
networks have been proposed in [1, 2]. What is common 
amongst these studies is that they follow a conventional 
cryptographic approach to achieve secure communication. 
Recently, there has been a lot of research that follows 
information theoretic approaches for secret key generation.  
This involves exploiting properties of the physical layer; 
particularly, the random nature of the wireless channel to 
increase security. A theoretical foundation for this approach is 
given in [3]. Work proposed in [4-7], suggests that users 
sharing a common fading channel (as a result of the channel 
reciprocity property) can use the spatially dependent statistics 
of the channel to construct a shared secret key. Under the 
assumption that an eavesdropper’s link is uncorrelated with 
the link between the legitimate parties, the eavesdropper is 
unable to establish this key. Thus, for the generation of secret 
keys, it is important that the two legitimate parties remain 
strongly correlated [8] and any eavesdropping channel remain 
sufficiently de–correlated with that of the legitimate parties; 
there by making it necessary to understand when such de-
correlation occurs.  
The measurement scenarios and techniques proposed here 
differ from that introduced in [9]. In the BAN context, the 
work in [9] assumed two eavesdroppers (Eves) with one 
positioned on the same body as the legitimate users (Alice and 
Bob) whilst the other was placed in an arbitrary position in the 
local surroundings. In this paper, however, we consider 
multiple co-located and distributed eavesdropping nodes 
positioned throughout the immediate environment with only 
the legitimate users positioned on the body. We therefore 
investigate whether the characteristics of the received signal 
for co-located and distributed eavesdropping positions are 
suitably uncorrelated with the signal characteristics at the 
legitimate parties to determine whether it is possible to 
achieve secure BAN communications in an indoor 
environment. 
This paper is organized as follows. Section II describes the 
experimental setup and the measurement procedure. Section 
III contains a comparison of received signal power time series, 
and correlation coefficient between Alice, Bob and Eves for 
different scenarios considered for a BAN operating in an 
indoor environment. Lastly, Section IV concludes this paper 
and also suggests some future directions for the work. 
II. EXPERIMENTAL SETUP AND MEASUREMENTS 
 The measurements conducted in this study were carried 
out in an open office area located on the first floor of the ECIT 
building at Queen’s University Belfast in the United 
Kingdom. The building mainly consists of metal studded dry  
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Fig.1 Open office area showing the position of Alice (node A), on the user’s left wrist, Bob (node B), on the same user’s waist, and Eves (node E’s) for (a) co-
located positioning of Eves and (b) distributed positioning of Eves. The test subject walked from point X to point Z and back for the mobile case and remained still 
at point Y for the stationary case.  
 
walls with metal tiled floors covered with polypropylene-
fiber, rubber backed carpet tiles, a metal ceiling with mineral 
fiber tiles and recessed louvered luminaries suspended 2.7 m 
above floor level. The office contained a number of chairs, 
metal storage spaces, doors and desks constructed from 
medium density fiberboard. These desks were separated by 
soft wooden partitions. 
 The test subject was an adult male of height 1.83 m and 
mass 80 kg. In the experiments conducted the antennas were 
mounted parallel to the body surface. The desired on-body 
link was established between two legitimate parties, Alice 
(node A), and Bob (node B). Alice was positioned on the left 
wrist of the test subject at a height of 1.15 m whilst Bob was 
positioned on the waist of the same test subject at a height of 
0.98 m, and multiple eavesdroppers (Eves; node E’s) were 
placed in fixed positions on surrounding desks. As illustrated 
in Fig. 1, two different eavesdropping configurations were 
considered. These were: (1) node E’s are co-located i.e. side-
by-side [Fig. 1(a)] and (2) node E’s are distributed throughout 
the immediate environment [Fig. 1(b)]. 
 Each of the A, B and E nodes consisted of an ML2730 
transceiver, manufactured by RFMD. The transceiver boards 
were interfaced with a PIC32MX which acted as a baseband 
controller and allowed the analog received signal strength 
indicator (RSSI) to be sampled with a 10-bit quantization 
depth. For the channel measurements conducted here, Alice 
acted as the transmitter outputting a continuous wave signal 
with a power of +21 dBm.  
 Alice transmitted first by sending a trigger pulse to all the 
radio receivers. The receivers started the signal capture when 
it received the trigger signal. These measurements were then 
repeated with Bob acting as the transmitter and Alice being 
the receiver. All the other nodes were configured to record the 
RSSI simultaneously (i.e. time synchronized) with a sample 
frequency of 1 kHz. They utilized identical sleeve dipole 
antennas (Mobile Mark model PSKN3-24/555) which were 
vertically polarized throughout all of the experiments. 
 The experiments were performed in a choreographed 
manner when the office was unoccupied except for the test 
subject on which the legitimate nodes were placed. The test 
subject also moved in a repeatable manner for the experiments 
requiring motion. It should be noted that in order to enable as 
realistic a characterization of the signal correlation as 
possible, the wireless spectrum at the measurement frequency 
was uncontrolled, that is other wireless devices operating 
within the test environment may have acted as sources of 
interference. 
 In this study, we considered four distinct indoor scenarios. 
Our first and second experiment, herein referred to as 
experiments 1 and 2, respectively, were performed with the 
test subject remaining stationary at point Y with co-located 
node E’s [Fig. 1(a)] and distributed node E’s [Fig. 1(b)]. The 
third and fourth experiment, herein referred to as experiments 
3 and 4, respectively, were carried out when the test subject 
walked from point X to point Z with co-located node E’s [Fig. 
1(a)]  and distributed node E’s [Fig. 1(b)]. 
 
III. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
A. Stationary Test Subject (Experiments 1 and 2) 
These experiments were conducted to study the channel 
variations observed for a quasi-stationary scenario. The 
localized correlation coefficient between Alice-Bob, Alice-
Eve and Bob-Eve channels were computed over a 0.5 second 
moving window over a 10 second period based on the Pearson 
product-moment correlation coefficient: 
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where,  and  are the RSSI values of the th packet of each 
node.  and  are the respective mean RSSI values of a 
(a) (b) 
sequence of  packets. Also, it should be noted that the 
correlation coefficient was calculated using the linear 
amplitude of the signal. 
 Table I shows the statistics of the correlation for 
experiments 1 and 2. As we can see, the mean correlation 
coefficients obtained here between the Alice-Bob, Alice-Eve 
and Bob-Eve channels were generally quite low. It is 
important to note that channel reciprocity was observed 
between the legitimate users’. However, in the stationary 
scenario as the mean signal level remains relatively constant, 
the observed low correlation between the legitimate nodes 
mainly occurred due to slight variations in the received signal 
caused by noise in the receiver. Because independent noise is 
observed at each of the users, a low correlation is seen.  
 For experiment 1 (co-located Eve nodes), the highest 
observed correlation coefficient was found to be 0.46, for the 
Bob-Eve6 link whereas for experiment 2 (distributed Eves), 
the highest observed correlation coefficient was found to be 
0.78 for the Bob-Eve1 link. Both these exceed the correlation 
coefficient value obtained for the legitimate users. Therefore, 
the results show that a stationary environment is not suitable 
for key generation in an indoor BAN. 
 
B. Co-located and Distributed Eavesdropper - Test Subject 
Walking (Experiment 3 and 4) 
 The variation in the received signal power measured by 
Alice, Bob and all of the Eves for experiments 3 and 4 are 
shown in Figs. 2 and 3 respectively. For the walking scenarios 
considered here, the channel displays some variation, with 
fluctuations between −28 dBm to −75 dBm. In BAN 
communications, it is anticipated that the movement of the 
human body may help to de-correlate the link with 
eavesdropping nodes, which are positioned in the local 
environment, with the legitimate on-body link. Figs. 4(a) and 
(b) show the normal probability density function (PDF) fitted 
to the empirical probability density of the localized correlation 
coefficient between Alice-Bob, Alice-Eve 4 and Bob-Eve 4, 
respectively. As we can see, the normal PDF provides a good 
fit to the empirical data (the mean and standard deviations are 
given in Table I). 
 It can also be seen from Figs. 4(a) and (b) that while the 
mean correlation coefficient is typically low, localized 
correlations greater than 0.70 can occur. In fact the largest 
correlation coefficient was found to be 0.81, which occurred 
for experiment 3 (co-located Eves), for the Alice-Eve4 
channel. For the same experiment, the highest correlation 
coefficient value observed for the legitimate users’ is 0.75. 
This indicates that for a co-located mobile scenario, 
generation of secret keys may not be possible. However, for 
experiment 4 (distributed Eves), the highest observed 
correlation coefficient was 0.80.This was greater than all the 
Alice-Eve and Bob- Eve channels. Based on these results, we 
can conclude that distributed mobile scenarios are better 
suited for key generation and secure communications can be 
achieved for this type of indoor BAN communications at 
2.45 GHz. 
 
 
 
Fig. 2 RSSI (dBm) versus time (sec) for Experiment 3 - Eves co-located 
and test subject walking for a duration of 0.5 seconds with a) Alice as the 
transmitter and b) Bob as the transmitter.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 3 RSSI (dBm) versus time (sec) for Experiment 4 - Eves distributed 
and test subject walking for a duration of 0.5 seconds with a) Alice as the 
transmitter and b) Bob as the transmitter.  
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Fig.4 Correlation coefficient calculated between (a) Alice-Bob, Alice-Eve4 and Bob-Eve4 for Experiment 3 (test subject walking, Eves co-located) 
(b) Alice-Bob, Alice-Eve4 and Bob-Eve4 for Experiment 4 (test subject walking, Eves distributed). Also shown for comparison is the theoretical 
Gaussian probability density function which is shown to provide a good fit to the data. 
 
 
TABLE I.  MEAN AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS OF THE LOCALIZED CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS FOR EACH OF THE SCENARIOS 
Eavesdroppers Eve 1 Eve 2 Eve 3  Eve 4 Eve 5 Eve 6  
Legitimate Receivers Alice Bob Alice Bob Alice Bob Alice Bob Alice Bob Alice Bob Alice-Bob 
EXPERIMENT 1: STATIONARY TEST SUBJECT - EVES CO-LOCATED; 
Mean (µ) 0.01 0.05 0.09 0.05 0.08 0.13 0.01 0.01 0.12 0.27 0.01 0.04 0.02 
Std. Deviation (σ) 0.05 0.08 0.08 0.12 0.06 0.08 0.05 0.10 0.05 0.09 0.03 0.10 0.04 
EXPERIMENT 2: STATIONARY TEST SUBJECT - EVES DISTRIBUTED;  
Mean (µ) 0.07 0.20 0.05 0.01 0.06 -0.01 -0.06 -0.04 0.29 0.45 0.10 0.18 -0.08 
Std. Deviation (σ) 0.09 0.33 0.14 0.34 0.11 0.30 0.15 0.11 0.16 0.11 0.15 0.29 0.13 
EXPERIMENT 3: TEST SUBJECT WALKING - EVES CO-LOCATED;  
Mean (µ) 0.02 0.12 0.08 -0.03 0.02 0.51 0.08 0.03 -0.08 0.08 -0.09 0.01 0.06 
Std. Deviation (σ) 0.28 0.22 0.23 0.23 0.25 0.27 0.32 0.21 0.24 0.21 0.25 0.29 0.23 
EXPERIMENT 4: TEST SUBJECT WALKING - EVES DISTRIBUTED; 
Mean (µ) -0.04 -0.18 0.02 -0.07 -0.02 -0.08 0.01 0.02 0.54 -0.00 -0.02 -0.01 0.01 
Std. Deviation (σ) 0.21 0.20 0.29 0.22 0.24 0.29 0.31 0.27 0.26 0.26 0.29 0.31 0.25 
 
 
 
IV. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
In this paper, we have measured the simultaneous channel 
response obtained for a desired on-body link and that 
obtained at multiple eavesdropper positions located in the 
immediate surroundings. Using this, we have investigated the 
localized correlation between the channel response at the 
legitimate and malicious users. The localized correlation 
coefficients suggest that secure key generation (and hence 
communication) can be achieved for this type of BAN 
communications in a mobile scenario. Future work will 
investigate the impact of the antenna type and polarization on 
secure BAN communications. 
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